Philosophy of Information and Pragmatistic Understanding of Information by Krebs, Jakob
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIII, 2011, 2, pp. 235-245 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Philosophy of Information and Pragmatistic Understanding 
of Information 
 
 
Jakob Krebs  
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt  
Institut für Philosophie 
J.krebs@em.uni-frankfurt.de 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
Conceptions, Relationality, and Pragmatics of Informativity 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I will raise a number of philosophical concerns about the 
conceptual puzzles related to Luciano Floridi‟s work on information. In 
response to the posed problems, I will sketch my own, pragmatist intuitions 
about an adequate reconstruction of the understanding of information in our 
everyday epistemic practices. While Luciano Floridi‟s writings were 
sustainably informative to me, especially his elaborated reconstruction of 
semantic information, there remain some questions related to the more 
ambitious project of a philosophy of information that I would like to address 
in the following sections. The first section discusses the analysis of the notion, 
respectively the notions of “information” itself, insofar an all too tolerant 
conceptual pluralism undermines not only the centrality of Floridi‟s semantic 
understanding of information, but furthermore invites theoretical 
equivocations and invalid inferences in inter-disciplinary communications.  
The second section treats the problematic idea to adhere to an objectivist 
understanding of information as a transferrable commodity, while at the 
same time emphasising its relationality, as Floridi‟s semantic definition of 
information suggests with respect to epistemic relevance. The third section 
deals with the centrality of the semantic definition itself and questions it with 
respect to the central, pragmatic intuition of informative events like 
metaphors, pictures or environmental clues that do not figure neatly in a 
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purely semantic approach. In a concluding section I will sketch a relational, 
pragmatist and inherently epistemic understanding of information, which 
reconstructs our everyday intuitions about information as de-reified 
informativity. Since this intuitively relational understanding of informativity 
contrasts with all objectivist conceptions, an integrative philosophy of 
information is in danger of losing contact to our epistemic self-understanding. 
 
 
 
2. One or many conceptions of information? 
 
The first issue concerns the prevalent, but loose talk about the concept of 
information, complemented by the idea that philosophical endeavors aim at 
an explication of the nature of information. Both ideas ignore controversial 
conceptions of information, since different uses imply different concepts and 
different concepts call for different extensions. In the literature we find a 
notorious under-determination with respect to the use of the word 
“information” in different contexts and the different concepts endowed by 
that. In a wittgensteinian perspective, different uses of words are the best 
evidence for different conceptions. In the light of the different uses in physics, 
biology, cognitive science or communication theory, it seems biased to start 
with a question about “the conceptual nature and basic principles of 
information” (Floridi 2011:1), since this idea suggests the existence of “the 
phenomenon of information” (Perez-Montoro 2007). Complementary to the 
assumption about a given phenomenon of information, there is the 
problematic idea that we start with Shannon‟s conception of information as a 
unifying core notion, a “well-understood notion [...with] often incompatible 
interpretations” (Allo 2011:1). The problem with those formal preferences is 
that Shannon himself occupied an already disparately used word for 
promoting reasons, a telling confession that Floridi repeatedly quotes (Floridi 
2011:81). 
Insofar it is at least unfortunate that Floridi sometimes seems to support 
such undifferentiated presuppositions, for example in framing the task of a 
philosophy of information as “offering the systematic treatment of the 
conceptual foundations of the world of information and of the information 
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society” (Floridi 2011:2) or in claiming to deal with “a specific kind of 
information” (Floridi 2011:82). He thereby seems to suggest that we already 
have a clear idea about the world of information, populated by kinds of one 
type of phenomenon. Fortunately, in Floridis writings those formulations 
contrast with far more careful considerations, exemplified in his use of the 
discomforting metaphor of a “conceptual labyrinth” (Floridi 2010:19), which 
hints at clear concepts and phenomena as desiderata. 
As far as I can see, the ongoing struggle about different uses of the word 
“information” poses a serious problem for a “philosophia prima” (Floridi 
2011:24). As long as we deceive ourselves with unifying presuppositions, we 
will have problems in finding any consensus on the range of a first 
philosophy. Maybe this is no catastrophic insight to the philosophy of 
information as an area of research, but to ignore the disparate use of a word 
and start with unifying assumptions leads to prejudiced analysis. The 
question in the context of an ambitious philosophy of information should be, 
how different uses of the word “information” reveal different conceptions of 
information, in order to explain conceptual interrelations - without 
presupposing that these must exist. I don‟t see any reason why there must be 
conceptual relations between homonyms, not even etymological ones. On the 
contrary, if real homonyms of information are conceptually confused, there 
remains a steady danger of theoretical equivocations. Hence, one should 
expect trans-disciplinary, invalid inferences, which lead to substantial 
consequences for example in educational practices in terms of “information 
literacy”. With respect to the unifying presuppositions quoted above, it is not 
yet clear, if we end with an integrationist or a differentialist philosophy of 
information, when welcoming a “healthy pluralism in the theory of 
information” (Scarantino/Piccinini 2011:157). Even the latter idea of a single 
theory of information should not be supported, since it should not come as a 
surprise that different concepts used in different contexts imply different 
theories. After these fundamental remarks on theoretical and conceptual 
pluralism I will proceed with questions more closely related to Floridi‟s 
projects. 
 
3. Transferability or relationality? 
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One prominent instance of a presupposition about “the nature of 
information” (Floridi 2011:14) is the persistent idea about the indubitable 
“information flow - understood as the carriage and transmission of 
information by some data” (Floridi 2011:32). My concern is that by 
conceptualising information as some transferable commodity, one binds 
oneself to a pragmatically unsustainable, since reifying understanding of 
information. It is the reification of information that collides with conceptions 
of information insisting on its relationality - as suggested by Floridis 
understanding of data (Floridi 2011:87) and his approach to semantic 
information in relation to types of informees (Floridi 2011:197). Combined 
with the intuition about relationality, the idea of a transfer or a flow leads to 
a theoretical paradox and consequently to misleading models of the relation 
between informative events and the means, processes, interests and 
competences of informed interpreters. What sense can we make out of the 
idea that what gets transferred depends - among other things - on the 
interests of the interpreter? 
For reasons of space I will illustrate the tension by an analogy, namely 
the idea that you can get rid of a fever by sweating it out. This is a popular 
advice, while any medic can explicate the ill-advised, underlying model: Since 
the word “fever” does not refer to a particular but to a relational property, 
there is no sensible way to account for the recovery by any kind of transfer. 
To conceptualise fever as a transferable commodity and hoping thereby to 
explain the underlying processes is obviously metaphorical, implying a 
categorical mistake: since fever is a relational property, it cannot figure in 
explanations that draw on the motion of a substance. A similar explanatory 
problem lies in the combination of transferability and relationality in the case 
of knowledge via semantic information: Conceptualising information as a 
particular deprives oneself of the possibility of claiming relationality, while 
conceptualising informativity as a relational property prohibits its 
transferability. Since the relevance-condition posed by Floridi clearly points 
towards a conception of informativity as a relational property of medial 
constellations, it is hard to see how the transferability-condition should hold 
at the same time. While the intuitions about transferability with respect to 
human communication have long  been reconstructed as technical remainders 
by metaphorological analysis (Reddy 1979), it is Floridis own approach that 
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tries to reconstruct a notion of information conforming to our everyday 
intuitions about the relation between informative events and the quest for 
pragmatically relevant knowledge. As soon as one commits oneself to the idea 
of relational informativity, one can easily immunise oneself against the 
misleading metaphors of transportation. The price one pays for the relational 
perspective is of course the loss of the explanatory forces that we gain by 
assuming mobile entities and their interaction with epistemic agents. But in 
taking seriously the fact that the same data can become informative in 
different ways, depending on the interests and competences of a given 
interpreter, one can see how uninformative the metaphor of transportation is 
in the end. To reduce explanations of belief revisions to explanations of 
mobilised information means to ignore the enormous problems we face in 
modelling the abductive competences and epistemic interests on the side of 
interested interpreters. Insofar Floridi approaches the latter, hard questions 
with respect to pragmatist conceptions of epistemic relevance, I wonder if his 
approach would suffer any bad consequences when relinquishing the 
transferability-jargon all together. We could still use it as a pragmatic 
shorthand - like the advice about fevers, but we should enlighten ourselves by 
a concentration on interpretative competences and theories of understanding 
when reflecting informativity in the light of relevance. Floridi‟s work is a rich 
and ramified mine in this respect, but I will nevertheless move on to question 
the adequacy or sufficiency of his semantic approach with respect to our 
everyday epistemic practices. 
 
 
4. Semantic information by non-semantic means? 
 
When observing our everyday epistemic practices, one wonders to what 
extend a semantic approach really can come to terms with the rich variety of 
medial formats like intonation, gestures, pictures, maps or tracks that become 
informative to interested, competent interpreters. It seems to me that 
semantically defined information misses important features of our social 
epistemic practices, insofar many information-artefacts are not 
propositionally structured. Many types of them might lead to propositionally 
fixed beliefs, but some forms of knowledge draw on other medial means. A 
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telling example for informative utterances that exceed the scope of a purely 
semantic perspective are metaphors, which can be found in Floridis work 
itself and which he addresses only shortly, as far as I can see (Floridi 2011: 
203). Consider Floridi‟s almost lyrical diagnosis about information being “a 
conceptual labyrinth” (Floridi 2010:19). Does this statement qualify as 
information? A more differentiated question would be: Under which 
conditions would this statement become relevant in the light of a question? 
According to Floridi, we have to reconstruct the content of the metaphor in 
the light of his version of a correctness theory of truth, where the relevance of 
the question derives from the context, namely the purpose with which the 
corresponding question was posed. But this hypothetical posing of purposeful 
questions in the light of the context quite obviously calls for pragmatic 
considerations about relevance. One wonders if this can really count as a 
strongly semantic approach any longer, respectively, one wonders which 
understanding of semantics got invested (Korta&Perry ###). This question 
concerns all metaphorical utterances, since their truth-value – if one is willing 
to assign one – clearly depends at least on the context and the competences of 
the interpreters (Guttenplan 2005:60). At first glance, Floridis labyrinth 
serves as a programmatic opener to his dealing with vexed problems 
about different conceptions of information. But furthermore, an 
understanding of the utterance will draw upon the respective conception of 
labyrinths that an interpreter must have, in order to have any idea what 
answer is given in this context. Is it a labyrinth with dead ends? How many 
passages are to be found? Is there one or are there many entrances or exits? 
In order to determine the informativeness of Floridis phrase, there should 
furthermore be a match between his own conception of labyrinths and the 
ones of the interpreters. Although the expression might be meaningful under 
any invested conceptions of labyrinth, in order to count as information, it 
must be meaningful and  true, while the case of metaphors illustrates that 
truth alone does not grant informativity (compare Floridi‟s own example of 
the negative metaphor „Mary is not a fox‟ (Floridi 2011:203)). The 
veridicality in the labyrinth-case is bound to Floridis conception of 
conceptual labyrinths – whether we want to make a statement about his 
beliefs or an intellectual inquiry in general. The notoriously difficult questions 
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I am not even dare to address here concern the identity of thoughts and what 
it means to share a thought in general. 
In order to determine what conception of labyrinths got invested in 
Floridis metaphorical statement, it is informative to browse the context of the 
utterance yet a bit further. The enlightening conceptual maps presented by 
Floridi (Floridi 2010:19) might then appear as an answer to the question, 
what Floridi might have in mind, when he talks about labyrinths. But in 
which sense are these maps and their contextual interpretation to be 
understood semantically? What we find are arrangements of concepts related 
by lines, structured as a reversed tree with one entrance, a few dead-ends and 
knowledge as the exit. Now this diagram is not itself propositionally 
structured, although I took my chance to summarize the presented elements 
and relations in propositional form. As a diagrammatic representation of 
conceptual relations, there seems to be an exclusive connection between 
semantic content, information and knowledge. But where in this picture 
should we place Floridis metaphor and the corresponding diagram? Maybe we 
can stick with the last remnants of semantic explanations of metaphor, but 
how can films, models, pictures, diagrams and the like fit in Floridis semantic 
passage through the informational labyrinth? 
My hunch is that they cannot and should not be integrated in Floridis 
picture, since it does not sufficiently differentiate between the means by 
which knowledge is acquired and the resulting belief states, eminently - but 
not exclusively - individuated by propositions. To learn from a photograph 
about the appearance of an unknown person intuitively qualifies as an act of 
informing someone about something, while the photo serves as a perceptoid 
sign and the content of the acquired memory is not propositionally but 
pictorially individuated. To get informed about the actual size of the 
continents by Peter‟s projection reveals how misled our normal representation 
of the world is - and this is by far a richer thought than the one that we are 
misled. Similarly, one‟s positioning in the world by means of a map is not a 
propositionally comprehensible competence, but a bodily awareness about 
ones surrounding and some of its features. Even worse, one‟s positioning on 
Floridi‟s conceptual map requires even more imaginative capacities, while 
drawing on the competences acquired by acquaintance with the use of real 
maps as non-propositional representations of spatial relations.  
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Even more intriguing for a strictly semantic approach is Floridi‟s 
marking of the „regions‟ in his conceptual map, with which the surrounding 
text is occupied: “You are here” on a regular map is informative for 
interpreters who know to „read‟ maps. But this proposition seems to be in 
danger of falling out of the space of Floridi‟s account of relevant semantic 
information, since considered strictly semantically, it is a sentence that is 
always true, hence hardly ever relevant in a straight-forward sense. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the meaning of Floridis “You are here” is 
supported by an arrow, hinting at different regions in the map. The sentence 
together with this arrow allow competent interpreters to position themselves 
within an ongoing conceptual analysis – in the space of reason, as one might 
say. On the other hand, the arrow points to some abstract space – away from 
the reader‟s body, to a region where he is not! So, strictly speaking, the 
sentence becomes false in the context of the ostensive hint, again endangering 
its qualification as information in Floridi‟s perspective. In order to count this 
combination of signs as informative, one needs to know a lot about maps, 
conceptual analysis and philosophical inquiries in general, permanently using 
the presented means (propositional, signicative, pictorial...) to understand the 
depiction as a response to potential questions – but not so much as a 
propositional answer. So the response Floridi gives is itself semantically 
under-determined, since many epistemic means he uses himself exhibit either 
pragmatic constraints, rely on implicatures or fall out of the scope of 
propositionality all together. I wonder how one can at this stage differentiate 
between a strongly semantic approach and an inferentialist understanding of 
information – a conception Floridi uses as a contrast to his own (Floridi 
2011:31). 
As a consequence, Floridi‟s semantic approach reveals problems in 
dealing with non-propositional occasions of epistemic modifications, since it is 
prone to classify both the worldly occasion and the cognitive effects as 
„information‟ under a semantic description. Although it is certainly true that 
revisions of belief are best traceable in a propositional mode, there seem to be 
forms of knowledge that cannot qualify as propositional. Yet other formats of 
knowledge may appear propositionally individuated, while their content is 
non-propositionally grounded in phenomenal memories. In other words, if 
there are non-propositional forms of knowledge, a semantic approach must 
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implicitly or explicitly exclude those cases form the definition of information. 
But this leads to a rather restricted conception of information, which falls 
short on our daily epistemic practices, since these practices do not always 
draw on propositionally well-formed occasions. Examples for the problematic 
modes of knowledge in question are those of pictorial representation and 
other perceptoid signs as well as knowledge about practices, persons, locations 
and last but not least metaphors as semantic disturbances.  
In the light of Floridis erotetic approach, these modes of knowledge may 
be represented propositionally as answers to questions, but these 
propositional means serve mostly in communicative acts about this 
knowledge, while the means to respond to the question must not be 
semantically structured. Questions about how, who, or where (Schaffer 2007) in 
many cases may be reasonably responded to by non-propositional means, like 
gestures, photos, maps or films. Responses to those questions may be 
informative, even though there are no propositionally structured expressions 
or thoughts involved. In some cases, propositionally structured expressions 
are unavailable or simply no rational means to initiate epistemic 
modifications. Architectonic, choreographic or simply visual patterns for 
example cannot be fully „semantisised‟, while our epistemic practices allow us 
to „inform‟ ourselves and others about those occasions by means beyond 
semantics - by models, maps, pictures or films, which are quite regularly 
found in public space under the omnipresent sign „i‟. 
Since I am very sympathetic to Floridi‟s erotetic approach, I wonder if it 
could integrate answers that do not qualify as propositions – although it 
might sound paradoxically at first. But our practices of informing ourselves 
and others show that there are forms of responsitivity that cannot be reduced 
to knowledge with propositional contours. In this observation of epistemic 
practices, I see an adequacy-condition for any substantial conception of 
informativity that matches our self-understanding as epistemic agents. By 
the use of a pragmatist conception of relevance, it seems to me that Floridi 
already uses epistemological vocabulary in his account of semantic 
information upgraded to knowledge. In addition to the problem of non-
propositional forms of knowledge, maybe this dealing with relevance amounts 
not so much to an informational epistemology but to a pragmatist conception 
of informativity as I will shortly sketch in the last section. 
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5. A pragmatist understanding of informativity? 
 
As developed above, we find a pragmatist perspective implicit in Floridi‟s use 
of relevance as a necessary condition for the determination of semantic 
information and its upgrade to knowledge. With his use of terms like 
„informative‟ and „relational informativity‟, Floridi‟s account of information 
approximates to a pragmatic conception of information – a task he saw 
himself unaccomplished so far (Floridi 2004:57). It seems to me that his 
semantic approach in the end amounts to the missing pragmatic conception 
as soon as one tries to conceptualise the relation between information and 
knowledge. But since relevance is determined with respect to an interpreters 
given knowledge, her abductive competences and her epistemic interests, 
information – or rather informativity -  itself can hardly be a foundational 
conception for epistemologic enterprises. Informativity in Floridis sense 
appears to be itself an epistemically derived conception of the very relational 
property that medial constellations eventually instantiate with respect to 
pragmatically embedded interpreters.  
In my own sketchy words: Informativity depends on a given medial 
constellation as well as the interpreter, her competence and her contextually 
variable (epistemic) interests. Thereby it is Floridi‟s relevance-condition that 
leads to a pragmatist conception of informativity, which is epistemically 
framed from the very beginning, as our intuitive use of the word „information‟ 
in descriptions of our everyday epistemic practices suggests. „Semantisation‟ 
is the eminent but only one mode in which epistemic modification takes place. 
Therefore, information should not be identified with true propositions, since 
not all formats of knowledge can be subsumed under propositional 
descriptions. The underlying critique against rash reduction of different types 
of knowledge to propositional uniform knowing-that concerns the modes of 
represantations of the how, the where, the when, the who etc. Even in respect 
to seemingly clear cases of knowing-that, pragmatist perspectives point to the 
contextual factors that can determine different informational contents for the 
same proposition. The difference in verbal communication that plays a crucial 
role is the one between propositionally „minimal‟ forms of locutions and the 
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different illocutionary and perlocutionary forces unleashed by them. But in a 
broader, pragmatist conception of communicative acts one must come to 
terms with the observation that not only propositionally structured 
utterances can be informative. All kinds of non-propositional means 
like intonation, gestures, pictures and so on can be informative, without there 
being semantic means involved. Another important distinction concerns the 
difference between the occasions that become informative and the resulting 
epistemic states. It is this distinction that the metaphor of a transmission of 
information confuses. 
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